Raúl
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Re:AI Consciousness - 2009/04/23 18:17
And here my two cents on your comments: First of all, I think it is useful here to distinguish between functional and phenomenal aspects of Consciousness. When you refer to consciousness being produced as a consequence of electromagnetic phenomena, you are probably talking about phenomenal states.
Creating EM fields is obviously within the reach of current technology, and indeed I believe all electronic equipment produce EM signals. I am not familiar with the CEMI (Consciousness ElectroMagnetic Information field) theory [1], but if I understood it basics correctly, the endogenous electromagnetic field produced by the brain is functionally (causally) taking a role in the way neurons fire. In other words, according to this theory EM plays a functional role (not just a side effect without causal implications – epiphenomenon).
Whether the SEMI theory can be implemented in artificial devices as such, I am not sure, as you would need a mechanism/hardware able to both produce and react to EM in the appropriate manner. As the SEMI theory is not conferring any special or estrange property to the EM (it is considered just a functional mechanism), I don’t see why it couldn’t be just software simulated, without using any real electromagnetic fields. But then, we come back to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, which I don’t see addressed by this theory (maybe because I haven’t read too much about it).
About your proposal on creating EM with FPGA’s, although you can store the information you want by coding it into the generated EM, how can you manage to have your FPGA causally affected by the EM?? The problem I see is that there is no fundamental difference between keeping information representation in a FPGA itself (say regular hardware implemented neural networks) or encoding the same information in an electromagnetic field…
[1] SEMI Theory [2] Consciousentitites.com related post
Raúl Arrabales Moreno. conscious-robots.com/raul |