Re:Consciousness models applied in MC - 2007/05/08 23:08Yeah, there were a good deal of errors in StevenA's ideas- but interesting all the same. Anyway, the axioms give a sort of requirement for sentient and non-sentient (assuming that there is such a sharp dividing line); anything that satisfies the axioms is conscious. Then, assuming that there is some neurological correlation between the mathematical formalism annd the brain. Also, the brain would not be cloned, it would be a computer simulation of the mind of the brain. Does that clarify your questions?
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Raúl
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Re:Consciousness models applied in MC - 2007/05/10 01:38What you said about axioms as requirements for consciousness takes me again to the question of a test for consciousness. So, if we had a set of axioms (even though they only apply to a toy universe as you have defined) that fairly outline a dividing line (or dividing plane, or multidimensional criteria), could we use them as the base of a test for consciousness? I am thinking that could be the case that axioms are valid for defining what consciousness is, but they couldn’t be directly tested. I need to check again the nature of the axioms you were proposing…
I am still confused about the computer simulation stuff. When you say this:
if you program Bob’s computer mind to perceive being chased by a shark, then a part of Bob in real life will perceive it. The identity of Bob’s mind could be determined by some method of correlating brain signals with the computational processes occurring in the computer. In fact, if you were to program the “Bob” algorithm to run on, say, 30 different computers then the majority of him would perceive that shark.
I imagine 30 threads of consciousness, i.e. 30 selves. Or are they suppose to be connected and work as a unique mind?Raúl Arrabales Moreno. conscious-robots.com/raul
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Plato Demosthenes
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Re:Consciousness models applied in MC - 2007/05/10 21:52It would be like Hofstander's Twinworld. If the minds were all in contact with one another for at least a sizable portion of time, then, because of the innate physchological connection one has with their self, you would feel as though a part of you experienced what they did. Also, the self is the same in all of them (initially). Due to chaotic divergence, the minds might need to be recalibrated after a while, though. And as for the axioms...well, I think that it would all depend on the exact nature of the axioms and their neurological meanings.
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Raúl
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Re:Consciousness models applied in MC - 2007/05/14 18:26I don’t think that there is any scientific proof that could support the idea of the same mind living in two or more separate brains (please, correct me if I am wrong). Hofstadster’s twinworld (or “twinwirld” [1]) is just a thought experiment of a world where twins are viewed as a single self. A different thing would be a single, but distributed brain. I don’t see the point of different separated brains sharing a single self. If brain A has the machinery for producing consciousness, then a subjective and unique A’s thread of consciousness is produced. Then, if we look at a twin brain B, it will also has his own thread of consciousness. I can’t see how only one consciousness thread could emerge from two different brains.
[1] Douglas Hofstadter. I Am a Strange Loop. 2007. Basic Books. Page. 218.Raúl Arrabales Moreno. conscious-robots.com/raul
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Plato Demosthenes
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Re:Consciousness models applied in MC - 2007/05/14 21:39It wouldn't be the same mind persay - just two minds that initially acted the same and also thought themselves to be the same (regardless if they actually are).
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Re:Consciousness models applied in MC - 2007/05/15 20:56Ok, that makes more sense for me.. They could think to be the same if they share their experience, and that would require a communication between brains involving consciousness mechanisms directly.
I'll go back to the toy universe and definition of axioms for consciousness. Maybe I can understand this better after I have a better knowledge of the possible set of axioms...Raúl Arrabales Moreno. conscious-robots.com/raul
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Plato Demosthenes
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Re:Consciousness models applied in MC - 2007/05/29 21:43Sorry...I believe I made a mistake on my first post, when, during the formula section of the post, I used = instead of "is an element of". Because several of the functions are many to one, element notation is needed. Does that help to clarify things a bit?
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Re:Consciousness models applied in MC - 2007/05/31 13:47I've started a new forum thread exclusively dedicated to this issue, please continue discussion at:
where I've already added a few questions about your proposal. Cheers.Raúl Arrabales Moreno. conscious-robots.com/raul
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Plato Demosthenes
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Re:Consciousness models applied in MC - 2007/06/01 01:00Well...not to clog up this topic again, but I have a few ideas regarding zombies which I would like to bounce off of you, and didn't see anywhere else to put this. So, here it goes: Assume that Douglas Hofstadters' idea about minds having approximate copies of other minds (approximate starnge loops within your central one) inside of them is true. (Are you familiar with his work)? Then, for everyone you meet or even think about (for that matter, sense in anyway) that you think are conscious has a small, usually minute and blurry, portion of their consciousness within your mind. Zombies, by definition, act indistinguishable from a conscious being, so you think that they are conscious. This leads you to develop a strange loop of them in your mind. Since that strange loop, however small it may be, is all the consciousness they would have, you would have given them a mind, literally. Thus, by definition, they are no longer zombies. This means that one can never interact, in any way, with a zombie. Does that line of reasoning make any sense to you? Or is there a gaping logical flaw in it which I have not seen yet? I only recently thought of it, so probably I have not developed as fully as it can go, but it seems on first sight rather logical to me. Thanks!
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