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Written by Raúl Arrabales Moreno
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Wednesday, 29 July 2009 |
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A Scale for Measuring Machine Consciousness
ConsScale is a tool for assessing the functional level of consciousness of a creature. It has been specifically designed for the evaluation of Machine Consciousness implementations.
Now a ConsScale microsite is available where you can explore the conceptual levels of consciousness defined in the scale, learn how agents can also be rated using a quantitative score, and use the online calculator to rate your own implementations:
http://conscious-robots.com/consscale/
ConsScale is a framework for characterizing the cognitive power of a creature. ConsScale includes the definition of an ordered list of cognitive levels arranged across a developmental path. The arrangement of the levels is inspired on the ontogeny and phylogeny of consciousness in biological organisms. The basic assumption is that there exist different kinds of minds, and they can be characterized in terms of ConsScale criteria. Using ConsScale, characterization and assessment of consciousness can be performed using three related tools: - the ConsScale conceptual levels of consciousness (levels), - the CQS (ConsScale Quantitative Score) (CQS), and - the ConsScale radar graph representation (Calculator). In order to assess the level of artificial consciousness of an agent using ConsScale, its architectural components have to be identified and its cognitive skills tested. Using this information as input, the scale can be used to obtain both a qualitative and a quantitative measure of consciousness:

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Last Updated ( Wednesday, 29 July 2009 )
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Written by Raúl Arrabales Moreno
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Friday, 20 November 2009 |
Journal of Mind Theory
Rigor in Cognitive Science
The UPM Autonomous Systems Lab (AsLab) has recently launched a new journal in the field of congnitive science. The focus of the new Journal of Mind Theory (JMT) is on precise, succinct, non-interpretable theories of hypotheses on the nature of the mind. The journal is edited by Ricardo Sanz and Jaime Gómez, and the editorial board includes well known experts in the fields of cognitive science and machine consciousness.
This journal tries to capture the formal science of mind, attempting to pursue the ultimate goal of a unified formal theory of mind, but open to any proposal and not tied to a specific language.
The first two numbers of the JMT are alredy online (including papers from James Albus, Ron Cottan, Pentti Haikonen, Konrad Talmont-Kaminski, Andrée C. Ehresmann, Tariq Samad, Lorenzo Magnani, Sarah Rebecca, and others) :
- JMT Vol. 0. No. 1. - JMT Vol. 0. No. 2.
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Last Updated ( Friday, 20 November 2009 )
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Written by Pentti Haikonen
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Wednesday, 16 December 2009 |
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Pentti Haikonen comments invited by Conscious-Robots.com editor on the recent article about Haikonen's Architecture for Conscious Machines written by Trung Doan.
I wish to thank Trung Doan for his analysis of my approach towards machine consciousness here. Trung Doan has done a lot of work here as he illustrates the main principles with practical examples, which are worked out along the principles that I present in my book "Robot Brains".
 Dr. Haikonen I would like to add some comments. My realization relies on associative neurons, which form associative memories. An associative memory is a rather old invention, but it has not gained much popularity because of the so-called interference problem, which limits the capacity of the memory. My contribution relates to the interference problem and in my book I describe methods, which allow the interference-free use of the full capacity; the capacity of the associative memory can be the same as the capacity of similar complexity random access memory. However, if only partial capacity is used, then the associative memory also performs the act of classification.
Trung Doan notes correctly that the neural machinery does not operate with numeric values, instead the individual signals represent elementary features of sensed entities and these are the basic meaning of these signals. It is useful to note that in the machinery groups of signals that represent some sensed entity may be used to stand for completely different things; these signal groups act as symbols for these things. This is a necessary prerequisite for e.g. natural language and inner speech. Be first to comment this article | Add as favourites (31) | Quote this article on your site | Views: 279 | E-mail |
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Last Updated ( Thursday, 17 December 2009 )
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Written by Raúl Arrabales Moreno
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Friday, 22 January 2010 |
CRUBOTS
Conscious-Robots.com Utilities for Robot Simulation
CRUBOTS is a set of Robotics Developer Studio (MRDS) services developed as part of a research program in Machine Consciousness. Although these services were developed originally to work with the CERA-CRANIUM cognitive architecture, they can be reused in any robotics project.

As we work primarily with a Pioneer 3DX robot, most of the simulation services have been designed to be a reproduction of the real robotic mobile base.
CRUBOTS is distributed as a ZIP file containing the source code for all MRDS services. Each service code in enclosed in its own folder under packages/crubots in MRDS home directory.
See below for specific instructions and a description of the services included in CRUBOTS. Be first to comment this article | Add as favourites (7) | Quote this article on your site | Views: 107 | E-mail |
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Last Updated ( Sunday, 24 January 2010 )
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Written by Kevin O'Regan and Raúl Arrabales
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Monday, 08 February 2010 |
How to Make a Robot that Feels
This article is divided in two parts:
- A summary of Kevin O’Regan keynote talk at CogSys 2010 by Raúl Arrabales. - An invited extended discussion about the self and the role of action in sensation by Kevin O’Regan.
How to Make a Robot that Feels
“How to make a robot that feels” was the title of the keynote talk given by Kevin O’Regan at the CogSys 2010 conference last week. During this talk O’Regan introduced the so-called hard problem of consciousness (as coined by Chalmers) and explained his sensorimotor approach to (phenomenal) consciousness [1]. This talk and related ideas are of special interest for Machine Consciousness researchers since O’Regan offers an account for sensory feel which virtually eliminates the hard problem, and therefore the explanatory gap itself. In the following I will try to summarize the key ideas that I got from both the talk and further discussions we had with O’Regan during the CogSys conference.
Using the redness of red, quite typical example in philosophy of mind, O’Regan addressed the problem of designing a robot that feels. Note that in this context the word feel is not used as in Damasio’s work, but to refer to the what-is-it-like or qualia associated to conscious contents, i.e. sensory feel.
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Last Updated ( Monday, 08 February 2010 )
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